University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 56
Issue 1 Annual Survey

Article 6

11-1-2021

Civil Practice and Procedure
Christopher S. Dadak

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons,
State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher S. Dadak, Civil Practice and Procedure, 56 U. Rich. L. Rev. 13 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol56/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

ARTICLES
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Christopher S. Dadak *
INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the past year of Supreme Court of Virginia
opinions, revisions to the Virginia Code, and Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia impacting civil procedure here in the Commonwealth. On top of those changes, dealing with the pandemic certainly was a trying time for practitioners, the judiciary, and all
those involved in the administration of justice and the law. The
author appreciates the sacrifices made by all those individuals and
sympathizes with all who lost a loved one in this time.
The Article first addresses opinions of the Supreme Court of Virginia, then new legislation enacted during the 2020 General Assembly Session, and finally the approved revisions to the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Virginia.

* Associate, Guynn, Waddell, Carroll & Lockaby, P.C., Salem, Virginia. J.D., 2012, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2007, Washington and Lee University. The author
dedicates this Article in loving memory of Clint Andrew Nichols, Allen Chair Editor of Volume 47 of the University of Richmond Law Review, who tragically passed away on May 31,
2021. He is missed by all he came across in his far-too-short time with us.
Due to the publishing schedule, the relevant “year” is approximately July 2020 through
June 2021.
The author thanks the Law Review editors and staff who not only diligently worked on
this Volume but successfully dealt with pandemic-related interruptions to their legal studies.
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I. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
The Supreme Court of Virginia issued several noteworthy opinions affirming, clarifying, and affecting procedural quandaries
practitioners face.
A. Jurisdiction of Court After Nonsuit Order
The finality of orders and its impact on the jurisdiction of a court
pursuant to Rule 1:1 can be a merciless trap for the unwary or inattentive practitioner. In this case, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case, after the Fauquier County Circuit Court excluded
the testimony of his expert, nonsuited during trial.1 The circuit
court entered the nonsuit order on September 11, 2019, and the
defense moved for its costs within two days.2 In its motion the defense did not ask “that the court modify, vacate, or suspend the
nonsuit order.”3 The circuit court heard and stated that it would
grant the motion on October 1, 2019, twenty days after entry of the
nonsuit order.4 However, the circuit court did not enter the order
until November 5, 2019, “more than twenty-one days after [the]
entry of the nonsuit order.”5 The plaintiff appealed the order
awarding costs on the basis that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 1:1.6
“Nonsuit orders are generally treated as final orders for purposes of Rule 1:1.”7 The supreme court relied heavily on Wagner v.
Shird in its analysis.8 In Wagner, the Prince George County Circuit
Court entered a final order and then entered an order suspending
that order for thirty days while it considered a motion for remittitur.9 Just like in this case, the circuit court then orally stated that
it would grant the remittitur motion but did not enter the order
until more than thirty days had elapsed.10 The supreme court “concluded that the circuit court’s announcement from the bench that
1. Kosko v. Ramser, 299 Va. 684, 686, 857 S.E.2d 914, 914 (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:1
(Repl. Vol. 2021)).
2. Id. at 686, 857 S.E.2d at 914.
3. Id. at 686, 857 S.E.2d at 914–15.
4. Id. at 686, 857 S.E.2d at 915.
5. Id. at 686, 857 S.E.2d at 915.
6. Id. at 686, 857 S.E.2d at 915.
7. Id. at 687, 857 S.E.2d at 915.
8. Id. at 687, 857 S.E.2d at 915.
9. 257 Va. 584, 586, 514 S.E.2d 613, 614 (1999).
10. Id. at 586, 514 S.E.2d at 614.
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it would grant the motion for remittitur did not extend the length
of the stay, and, further, when the court actually entered the written judgment order on April 21, 2019, the court lacked jurisdiction
to do so,” which rendered the order a nullity.11
The defendants, who had succeeded on the motion for their costs,
argued that the nonsuit order was not final because 8.01-380(C)
“allows the recovery of costs after the nonsuit is taken.”12 They argued “the possibility of recovering costs means that the nonsuit order does not dispose of the entire action because something remains to be done, namely, the adjudication of a motion to recover
costs.”13 The supreme court disagreed because “[u]nder the defendants’ logic, anytime a litigant seeks other kinds of recoverable
costs, or for that matter files any post-trial motion, there would, by
definition, remain something to be done.”14 “Once a final written
order is entered, a trial court has twenty-one days to enter a new
written order or to enter a written order modifying, suspending, or
vacating the prior order to allow the court sufficient time to address the post-trial motion.”15
There are a couple practical pointers to take from this case. If
you can, if you have any outstanding issues, do not agree to or prevent a final order from being entered in the first place. It is much
easier if the clock does not start ticking. If a final order is entered,
one must move to vacate, stay, or suspend the order within twentyone days from its entry. Otherwise, Rule 1:1 irrevocably ends the
court’s jurisdiction, and any orders entered more than twenty-one
days after the order are a nullity.
B. Collateral Estoppel from Out-of-State Guardianship
Proceeding
The Supreme Court of Virginia analyzed in a wills and trusts
case whether collateral estoppel applied to the issue of mental competency.16 The facts paint a complex picture in terms of trusts and
testamentary capacity, but this Article will focus on the collateral
11. Kosko, 299 Va. at 687, 857 S.E.2d at 915 (citing Wagner, 257 Va. at 587–88, 514
S.E.2d at 615).
12. Id. at 688, 857 S.E.2d at 916.
13. Id. at 688, 857 S.E.2d at 916.
14. Id. at 688–89, 857 S.E.2d at 916.
15. Id. at 689, 857 S.E.2d at 916.
16. Plofchan v. Plofchan, 299 Va. 534, 537, 855 S.E.2d 857, 859 (2021).
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estoppel issue. Paula Plofchan (“Mrs. Plofchan”), living in Texas,
executed a durable power of attorney (“POA”) appointing her husband as her attorney-in-fact and in the alternative her son Thomas
Plofchan, Jr. (“Thomas”) as the attorney-in-fact.17 Her husband
passed away in 2001, making Thomas the attorney-in-fact.18 In
2006, Mrs. Plofchan created the Paula G. Plofchan Revocable Trust
(“Trust”) as both the grantor and the trustee.19 The Trust was to
be “construed and administered” under Virginia law.20 In 2013,
Mrs. Plofchan moved to New York to live with her daughter Jennifer.21 In June 2014, Mrs. Plofchan was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and in November 2016, resigned as trustee of the
Trust.22 She named Elizabeth, a different daughter, and Thomas
as cotrustees.23 “Less than a week later, two doctors . . . signed certificates of incapacity stating that M[r]s. Plofchan was deemed incapacitated pursuant the terms of the Trust Agreement.”24
In May 2018, Mrs. Plofchan executed a revocation of the POA
and “petitioned the Supreme Court of Westchester County, New
York, (the New York guardianship court) to appoint a guardian for
her, pursuant to Article 81 of the New York Mental Hygiene
Law.”25 While the petition was pending, Mrs. Plofchan sent a letter
to her children revoking the Trust.26 The sides litigated the issue
and the two doctors who had previously declared Mrs. Plofchan incapacitated revoked those earlier determinations.27 The court proceedings took four days and Mrs. Plofchan “was present, ‘meaningfully participated,’ and was represented by a counsel of her
choosing.”28 “The court-appointed evaluator also testified and her
report was admitted into evidence. She noted that M[r]s. Plofchan
could not delineate her assets or expenses, but that M[r]s. Plofchan

17. Id. at 538, 855 S.E.2d at 859.
18. Id. at 538, 855 S.E.2d at 859.
19. Id. at 538, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
20. Id. at 538, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
21. Id. at 538, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
22. Id. at 538, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
23. Id. at 538, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
24. Id. at 539, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
25. Id. at 539, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
26. Id. at 540, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
27. Id. at 539, 855 S.E.2d at 860.
28. Id. at 540, 855 S.E.2d at 861.
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felt she was being deprived of things she loved due to certain bills
not being paid.”29
In January 2019, the court ruled “denying M[r]s. Plofchan the
relief she sought and dismissing the proceeding.”30 “The New York
guardianship court found that M[r]s. Plofchan was not an incapacitated person as the term is defined in Article 81 of the New York
Hygiene Law, and declined to accept her consent to appoint a
guardian.”31 Instead, the court noted “that while it was clear that
M[r]s. Plofchan was unhappy with Thomas and Elizabeth’s management and felt a loss of control over her day-to-day decision-making, . . . there was no evidence of any fiduciary violations ‘sufficient
to render the current advanced directives [including the POA and
Trust] insufficient or unreliable.’”32
In April 2019, “Thomas and Elizabeth, as co-trustees of the
Trust, and Thomas as the attorney-in-fact for M[r]s. Plofchan, filed
a complaint against M[r]s. Plofchan in the Circuit Court for Fairfax
County” alleging “that M[r]s. Plofchan [was] incapacitated as it relates to financial matters, and that she had ineffectively attempted
to revoke the POA and the Trust.”33 The complaint sought monetary and injunctive relief.34 In response, Mrs. Plofchan filed a plea
in bar on the basis that collateral estoppel “barred the plaintiffs
from relitigating the issue of her mental capacity because the New
York guardianship court had made a factual finding that she was
not an incapacitated person.”35 The circuit court sustained the plea
in bar and the cotrustees appealed.36
On appeal the cotrustees argued that “the issue litigated in the
New York guardianship proceeding and the issues in the current
proceeding concerning M[r]s. Plofchan’s mental capacity [were] not
the same” because the “standards to determine mental capacity are
different in New York, Virginia, and Texas.”37 In response, Mrs.
Plofchan argued that “though the legal standards are different, the
factual finding made by the New York guardianship court, that
29. Id. at 540, 855 S.E.2d at 861.
30. Id. at 540, 855 S.E.2d at 861.
31. Id. at 540, 855 S.E.2d at 861.
32. Id. at 540–41, 855 S.E.2d at 861.
33. Id. at 541, 855 S.E.2d at 861.
34. Id. at 541, 855 S.E.2d at 861–62.
35. Id. at 542, 855 S.E.2d at 862.
36. Id. at 542, 855 S.E.2d at 862.
37. Id. at 543, 855 S.E.2d at 862.
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M[r]s. Plofchan was not an incapacitated person, meets the capacity requirements in Virginia and Texas.”38
At the outset, the Supreme Court of Virginia reiterated that for
collateral estoppel to apply, the party asserting it has the burden
of establishing four elements: (1) privity of the parties, (2) the same
issue of fact was litigated, (3) that same issue was essential to the
prior judgment, and (4) “the prior proceeding must have resulted
in a valid, final judgment against the party against whom the doctrine is sought to be applied.”39 The Supreme Court of Virginia
found that Mrs. Plofchan could not establish the second element
for two reasons.40 “First, the New York guardianship court evaluated M[r]s. Plofchan’s mental capacity in terms of whether she
needed a guardian appointed to protect her interests, applying a
different standard than is applied when determining testamentary
or contract capacity.”41 In addition, “the issue of whether M[r]s.
Plofchan specifically had the capacity to revoke her Trust and POA
was not actually litigated.”42 The Court specifically pointed out
that the New York Mental Hygiene law under which the prior litigation ensued used a different “standard . . . from the New York
standard for determining whether an individual had capacity to
execute trust documents.”43 Therefore, “[t]he determination of
whether M[r]s. Plofchan had capacity to execute or revoke the POA
and the Trust was not actually litigated in the New York guardianship proceeding.”44 Because the same capacity issues “were not
actually litigated in the New York guardianship proceeding . . . collateral estoppel does not preclude those [mental capacity] issues
from being litigated in this case.”45
This case illustrates the high burden a party faces to establish
collateral estoppel. It truly needs to be the exact same issue with
the exact same parties. And be particularly wary on relying on outof-state proceedings for collateral estoppel in Virginia. The Court
noted Virginia and New York standards on testamentary capacity
are different, casting doubt on whether collateral estoppel would
38. Id. at 543, 855 S.E.2d at 862.
39. Id. at 543–44, 855 S.E.2d at 863.
40. Id. at 544, 855 S.E.2d at 863.
41. Id. at 544, 855 S.E.2d at 863.
42. Id. at 544, 855 S.E.2d at 863.
43. Id. at 544, 855 S.E.2d at 863.
44. Id. at 545, 855 S.E.2d at 863.
45. Id. at 546, 855 S.E.2d at 864.
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have applied even if the New York court had applied its usual testamentary capacity standard and not New York Mental Hygiene
law.46 It takes detailed fact-specific analysis to assess whether a
potential plea of collateral estoppel has a chance of success.
C. Attorney’s Fees for Breaching Covenant Not to Sue
At some point, most, if not all, litigators daydream about not
only winning but also recovering attorney’s fees. As Virginia practitioners know, statutorily or contractually provided for attorney’s
fees are generally the only means for such recovery on state law
claims. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia added an exception to that rule in its recent ruling on a covenant not to sue.
William Bolton and John McKinney “were partners in a business
venture called Skyline Building Systems, L.L.C.” (“Skyline”).47 Bolton ended up buying out McKinney fairly quickly, but McKinney
“stayed on as an employee.”48 After McKinney was fired, he
“brought several lawsuits against Skyline and Bolton, causing Skyline to lose its financing and go out of business.”49 Sadly, “Bolton
filed for bankruptcy shortly thereafter, with McKinney listed as a
creditor.”50 “During the bankruptcy proceedings,” the parties settled and entered into a mutual release of claims.51 Bolton paid
McKinney $25,000, and McKinney “relinquished all rights to sue
the Boltons.”52 “The recitals stated: ‘It is the intention of the parties
that . . . there be no more litigation among the parties or claims
asserted by any of them against the others.’”53 The settlement
agreement also included a mandatory arbitration provision.54 As
the reader can likely guess, “[l]ess than a year after entering into
the settlement agreement, McKinney breached the covenant not to
sue by suing Bolton twice in state court and once in federal court

46. Id. at 544–45, 855 S.E.2d at 863–64.
47. Bolton v. McKinney, 299 Va. 550, 552, 855 S.E.2d 853, 854 (2021).
48. Id. at 552, 855 S.E.2d at 854.
49. Id. at 552, 855 S.E.2d at 854.
50. Id. at 552, 855 S.E.2d at 854.
51. Id. at 552, 855 S.E.2d at 854.
52. Id. at 552, 855 S.E.2d at 854–55.
53. Id. at 552, 855 S.E.2d at 855.
54. Id. at 552, 855 S.E.2d at 855.

20

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:13

for claims relating to his time at Skyline.”55 All three lawsuits were
dismissed.56
In response, Bolton then filed suit in Rockingham County Circuit Court seeking $80,000 in attorney’s fees incurred defending
the three lawsuits and “an injunction to prevent McKinney from
pursuing further actions.”57 McKinney first moved to dismiss on
the basis that the mandatory arbitration provision controlled.58
The circuit court denied that motion holding that “McKinney had
waived the right to enforce the arbitration clause by filing multiple
lawsuits against Bolton.”59 The circuit court then granted partial
summary judgment in Bolton’s favor on liability regarding breach
of contract but ultimately ruled that it could not award damages
(the attorney’s fees) because there was no statutory basis and the
settlement agreement was “silent on whether fees should be
awarded if the case was resolved at trial.”60 Bolton appealed to the
Supreme Court of Virginia.
“Virginia follows the American rule on attorney’s fees, under
which ‘generally, absent a specific contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, attorney’s fees are not recoverable by a prevailing litigant from the losing litigant.’”61 However, attorney’s fees
for a breach of a covenant not to sue was a matter of first impression and the court compared two different approaches by other jurisdictions. “Jurisdictions that do not allow for the award of attorney’s fees in this circumstance reason that the parties can provide
for attorney’s fees in the contract if they so choose.”62 Other jurisdictions carve out an exception to the American rule for “those
cases in which attorney fees are not awarded to the successful litigant in the case at hand, but rather are the subject of the lawsuit
itself.”63

55. Id. at 553, 855 S.E.2d at 855.
56. Id. at 553, 855 S.E.2d at 855.
57. Id. at 553, 855 S.E.2d at 855.
58. Id. at 553, 855 S.E.2d at 855.
59. Id. at 553, 855 S.E.2d at 855.
60. Id. at 553, 855 S.E.2d at 855. Apparently, it only provided for attorney’s fees for a
prevailing party in arbitration. Id. at 556, 855 S.E.2d at 857.
61. Id. at 554, 855 S.E.2d at 855 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 555, 855 S.E.2d at 856 (first citing Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 363
F.2d 1002, 1008 (2d Cir. 1966); then citing Bunnett v. Smallwood, 793 P.2d 157, 161 (Colo.
1990); and then citing Dodge v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 417 A.2d 969, 976 (Me. 1980)).
63. Id. at 555, 855 S.E.2d at 856 (first citing Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443,
454 (9th Cir. 1987); then citing Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters
Local Union No. 377, 700 F.2d 1067, 1072 (6th Cir. 1983); and then citing Paper, Allied,
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The Court quoted with approval the New Hampshire Supreme
Court:
When a party requests attorney’s fees and costs in defending the action as consequential damages for breach of a covenant not to sue, this
request does not seek an award of attorney’s fees within the meaning
of the American Rule. Rather, under these circumstances, attorney’s
fees and costs help to put the non-breaching party in the position it
would have been in had the breach not occurred.64

The New Hampshire court further explained that “the lawsuit itself is the object that the bargain intended to prohibit.” 65 The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed and held that allowing for attorney’s fees in a breach of a covenant not to sue “compensates the
injured party for its loss and puts it back in the same position in
which it would have been had the other party adhered to its promise.”66 The Court further affirmed the circuit court’s determination
that McKinney had “waived his right to enforce the arbitration provision by bringing numerous lawsuits.”67
The Court emphasized that it did “not overrule the general rule
in Virginia law that attorney’s fees are not recoverable as damages.”68 While it insists this analysis is limited to a breach of a covenant not to sue, the logic could slowly lead to an expansion of attorney’s fees for other claims.69 It is worth noting that Bolton had
multiple alternative means of securing his fees. First, he could
have included in the settlement agreement a broader attorney’s
fees provision. Second, it is unclear why he did not remove the prior
lawsuits to arbitration where he should have recovered attorney’s
fees. Lastly, he could have moved for sanctions in the prior lawsuits as they appear to have lacked a good faith basis. If courts
were more willing to sanction frivolous claims, then the Supreme
Court of Virginia would not have had to expand the grounds for
recovering attorney’s fees. Awarding fees in this case certainly was

Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union, Local 5-508 v. Slurry Explosive Corp., 107 F. Supp.
2d 1311, 1331 (D. Kan. 2000)).
64. Id. at 555–56, 855 S.E.2d at 856 (quoting Pro Done, Inc. v. Basham, 172 N.H. 138,
210 A.3d 192, 203 (N.H. 2019)).
65. Pro Done, 210 A.3d at 202.
66. Bolton, 299 Va. at 556, 855 S.E.2d at 857.
67. Id. at 556, 855 S.E.2d at 857.
68. Id. at 557, 855 S.E.2d at 857.
69. After all, litigation and attorney’s fees are a foreseeable consequence of most, if not
all, material breaches of contract.
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the equitable result, but perhaps it could have been achieved without a change in Virginia law on the recovery of attorney’s fees.
D. Appeals by Persons Who Were Not Parties
In an adoption case, the Supreme Court of Virginia clarified who
and how may attack orders as void ab initio due to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.70 In 2013, Elizabeth Quinn who had a child
from a previous relationship, married James LeRoy Quinn.71 Elizabeth’s mother is Michelina Bonanno.72 The next year, in 2014, a
court awarded joint legal custody of the child to Elizabeth and
Michelina, physical custody to Elizabeth, and a visitation schedule
to Michelina.73 Unfortunately, Elizabeth passed away in October
2018.
A couple months later, James “filed a petition for adoption.”74
Due to the undisputed “lack of visitation or contact” from the
child’s biological father, James argued that he did not need the biological father’s consent to the adoption.75 As to Michelina, James
argued that her consent was also unnecessary “because she was
not a parent of the child and grandparents have no parental
rights.”76
The circuit court, by entered order, referred to the Department
of Social Services (“DSS”) for an investigation pursuant to Virginia
Code section 63.2-1208.77 DSS attempted to contact Michelina several times but were ultimately only able to “exchange[] . . .
voicemail messages.”78 DSS sent a certified letter to Michelina,
“which was signed for” eventually.79 “After interviewing James and
the child, the social worker reported favorably on their relationship
and recommended that the [circuit] court enter a final order of
adoption without an interlocutory order and probationary period
under [Virginia] Code [section] 63.2-1210.”80 DSS filed a

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Bonanno v. Quinn, 299 Va. 722, 858 S.E.2d 181 (2021).
Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 182.
Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 182.
Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 182.
Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 182.
Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 182–83.
Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
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supplemental memorandum regarding a phone call with Michelina
where she “denied knowledge of James’s petition to adopt the child
and denied consent to the adoption.”81 The memorandum also summarized Michelina’s concerns that she had also provided over
email.82 Several weeks later on April 30, 2019, the “court entered
a final order of adoption” which, on May 21, 2019, James forwarded
to Michelina via e-mail.83
On May 30, 2019, Michelina filed a notice of appeal to the Court
of Appeals of Virginia and simultaneously in circuit court filed “a
motion to unseal the proceeding and to vacate and set aside the
final order” as well as a motion to stay the order.84 In addition to
arguing the merits in the motion, Michelina argued that the final
order “was void due to fraud upon the court and lack of notice to a
legal custodian.”85 “Alternatively, she argued that the court retained jurisdiction to alter the order within six months under [Virginia] Code [section] 63.2-1216.”86 Later in July, she “filed another
motion asserting that the order was void ab initio on the ground
that James had not fulfilled the procedural requirements for a
step-parent adoption as required by [section] 63.2-1214.”87
Michelina continued her attack on the adoption order in both the
court of appeals and circuit court. She filed her petition with the
court of appeals and requested a hearing in circuit court on her
motions.88 The circuit court issued a letter opinion stating it “may
consider whether an earlier order is void ab initio after the 21-day
period provided by Rule 1:1 has elapsed, [but] in this case [Michelina’s] appeal . . . divested the circuit court of jurisdiction in the
matter.”89 James filed a motion to dismiss her appeal on the basis
that she “had not filed a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding below” despite having “actual and constructive notice as a
result of the Department of Social Services’ attempts to contact

81. Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
82. Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
83. Id. at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 183. The court noted this email was sent after 4:00 PM. Id.
at 727, 858 S.E.2d at 183. Perhaps the timing of waiting twenty-one days was not coincidental to the Court.
84. Id. at 727–28, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
85. Id. at 728, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
86. Id. at 728, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
87. Id. at 728, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
88. Id. at 728, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
89. Id. at 728, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
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her.”90 Therefore, according to James she did not have standing to
appeal as she was a nonparty.91 The circuit court then entered an
order denying Michelina a hearing “for the reasons stated in its
letter opinion” which prompted Michelina to file a second notice of
appeal (based on that order as opposed to the adoption order).92
“The [c]ourt of [a]ppeals consolidated the two appeals.”93 “[T]he
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals granted James’ motion and dismissed the appeals . . . . because [Michelina] had neither moved to intervene nor
entered an appearance before entry of the final order” making her
a nonparty and “lack[ing] standing to appeal.”94 Michelina appealed.95
Michelina first argued that the court of appeals erred in holding
“that she was not a party to the proceeding below.”96 The Supreme
Court of Virginia began its analysis on the use of “party” in the
applicable statutory language: “[a]ny aggrieved party may appeal
to the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals.”97 To the Court, “[t]he dispositive issue
is the meaning of the word ‘party.’”98 It noted that “‘party’ is not
merely a synonym of ‘person.’”99 Furthermore, the General Assembly has separately used both “party aggrieved” or “aggrieved party”
versus “person aggrieved” or “aggrieved person” in a significant
number of statutes.100 Pointing to examples from different statutes
the court “illustrate[d] that the General Assembly knows the difference between persons and parties.”101
However, “that only a ‘party’ may appeal to the [c]ourt of
[a]ppeals [was] only the first step in [their] analysis” and next the
Court analyzed “what kind of ‘party’ the General Assembly
meant.”102 The Court stated that, generally, a “party” meant “a

90. Id. at 728, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
91. Id. at 728, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
92. Id. at 728, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
93. Id. at 728, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
94. Id. at 728, 858 S.E.2d at 183–84.
95. Id. at 729, 858 S.E.2d at 184.
96. Id. at 729, 858 S.E.2d at 184.
97. Id. at 729, 858 S.E.2d at 184 (emphasis omitted) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-405
(Repl. Vol. 2020)).
98. Id. at 729, 858 S.E.2d at 184.
99. Id. at 729, 858 S.E.2d at 184. Notably, later in its opinion, the court “expressly reject[ed] the general legal definition that equates the terms ‘aggrieved party’ and ‘person
aggrieved.’” Id. at 739 n.1, 858 S.E.2d at 190 n.1.
100. Id. at 729, 858 S.E.2d at 183.
101. Id. at 730, 858 S.E.2d at 184.
102. Id. at 730, 858 S.E.2d at 184.
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party to the lawsuit.”103 The Court further acknowledged that
“[t]here are other, specific meanings of [a] ‘party’ . . . that include
. . . those who could be joined, those who should be joined, or those
who must be joined, but who have not been joined yet.”104 However,
pointing to Wingfield v. Crenshaw, the Court held “that the General Assembly did not intend the word ‘party’ in [Virginia] Code
[section] 17.1-405 to include those who might, should, or must be
joined as parties, but rather to include only those who actually
have been so joined.”105 That case’s syllabus stated “an appeal is
not allowable ‘in behalf of a person, who may be interested, but
whose name does not appear as party, in the record of’ the court
from which the appeal is taken.”106 The Court, therefore, conclusively held “that the term ‘aggrieved party’ in [section] 17.1-405
. . . confers standing to bring an appeal to the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals
only on those who were litigants joined in the [lower court] proceeding. . . .”107
The Court went on to explicitly clarify several procedural issues
that provide guidance for future cases. First, the Court’s holding
on standing did not and does not prevent a litigant from filing a
motion to intervene in a matter and becoming a party.108 If that
motion is granted, then obviously as discussed above, the litigant
becomes a party and has full standing and rights of appeal as any
other party. If the Court denies the motion to intervene, then the
litigant may appeal that denial of becoming a party, but not the
merits of the case itself.109
The Court also clarified that a notice of appeal only divests the
lower court of jurisdiction once the twenty-one days (or other applicable timeline) passes.110 “[T]he lower court retains jurisdiction
to do acts it is expressly empowered to do by statutes or the Rules
103. Id. at 730, 858 S.E.2d at 184 (quoting Party, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019)).
104. Id. at 730, 858 S.E.2d at 185.
105. Id. at 731, 858 S.E.2d at 185; 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 245, 258–59 (1808) (Fleming, J.,
seriatim opinion).
106. Bonanno, 299 Va. at 731, 858 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting Wingfield, 13 Va. at 245).
107. Id. at 732, 858 S.E.2d at 185 (emphasis omitted).
108. Id. at 732, 858 S.E.2d at 185.
109. Id. at 732, 858 S.E.2d at 185–86. “However, an appeal from the denial of a motion
for leave to intervene brings only the subject of the motion and whether it should have been
granted, not the merits of the case, before the appellate court.” Id. at 732, 858 S.E.2d at 186
(citing Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Va. Marine Res. Comm’n, 45 Va. App. 208, 214 n.3, 609
S.E.2d 619, 622 (2005)).
110. Id. at 733–34, 858 S.E.2d at 186.
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of this Court within the periods of time provided for doing.”111 So
the circuit court was correct in that it did not have jurisdiction to
hear Michelina’s motions, but on the basis that more than twentyone days had elapsed from the order, not simply because Michelina
had also filed a notice of appeal.112
Finally, the Court explained how void ab initio (or at least arguably void) orders may be attacked or declared as void. Michelina
strongly argued in reliance on language from the Court’s opinion
in Virginian-Pilot Media Cos. v. Dow Jones & Co.:
[Void ab initio orders] are absolute nullities, and may be impeached
directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere at any time, or in any
manner; and may be declared void by every court in which they are
called in question. . . . The point may be raised at any time, in any
manner, before any court, or by the court itself.113

The Court noted that opinion was “limited . . . to judgments challenged as void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”114 Importantly, the appellant in that case “had followed a valid method
to bring the appeal: it had filed a motion to intervene in the circuit
court, which denied the motion, and then appealed from the denial.”115 The Court distinguished Virginian-Pilot from Michelina’s
appeal in the following ways: the Court in this case for instance,
had the “power to adjudicate adoption petitions under [Virginia]
Code [sections] 17.1-513 and 63.2-1201” and Michelina “did not file
a motion to intervene.”116 The Court “still further . . . declar[ed]
that the language . . . that orders void even for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged ‘by all persons, anywhere, at any
time, or in any manner,’ is a rhetorical flourish that does not accurately state the law.”117 “Consequently, [the Court] strongly discourage[s] litigants from invoking that language in future proceedings.”118

111. Id. at 733, 858 S.E.2d at 186.
112. Id. at 734, 858 S.E.2d at 186.
113. 280 Va. 464, 469–70, 698 S.E.2d 900, 903 (2010) (emphasis added).
114. Bonanno v. Quinn, 299 Va. at 734, 858 S.E.2d at 187 (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 735, 858 S.E.2d at 187 (citation omitted).
116. Id. at 735, 858 S.E.2d at 187. “[C]ircuit courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate adoptions, so there is nothing more for us to decide on that question.” Id. at 735,
858 S.E.2d at 187.
117. Id. at 736, 858 S.E.2d at 188 (quoting Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer, 144 Va. 692, 704,
130 S.E.2d 902, 906 (1925)). The author would still advise litigants to refrain from describing any other Supreme Court of Virginia analysis as a “rhetorical flourish.”
118. Id. at 738, 858 S.E.2d at 189.
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The Court concluded with specific guidance on how to challenge
an order that is void ab initio absent a motion to intervene. One
“may take the risk of putting it to the test by violating it” when
proceedings to enforce it are instituted “raise the argument that
[the order] is void and a nullity in defense.”119 The risk is “if the
defense subsequently proves unsuccessful, he or she would then
face the consequences of disobedience.”120 A less risky option is to
file “an action seeking a declaratory judgment” or a motion to vacate.121 The Court noted that the twenty-one-day timeline in Rule
1:1 “does not apply to a motion to vacate or set aside a judgment
on the ground that it was void ab initio when the motion was filed
by a party to the proceeding in which the putative judgment was
entered.”122
This case captures the importance of a solid understanding of
civil procedure. Michelina could have attacked the adoption order
in a myriad of ways. Unfortunately, she chose a path that did not
give her a chance to attack the merits of the case.
E. Inviting Error Doctrine
An eminent domain case serves as a useful reminder that a party
cannot invite error and hope to prevail on that issue. A business
“owned 44.048 acres of land in Fluvanna County” of which the Virginia Department of Transportation (“VDOT”) condemned 0.166 of
an acre in fee simple, 0.103 of an acre for a permanent drainage
easement, and 0.0443 of an acre in temporary construction easements.123 The merits of the condemnation case are not germane to
the procedural issue. The parties could not agree on the value of
the take and proceeded to trial.124 After trial before commissioners,
there was a majority award (three commissioners) and minority
award (two commissioners), with minority award being roughly
half of the majority award.125 Both awards were identical as to the
fee simple acquisition, drainage easement, and temporary

119. Id. at 737, 858 S.E.2d at 188.
120. Id. at 737, 858 S.E.2d at 188.
121. Id. at 737, 858 S.E.2d at 188.
122. Id. at 737, 858 S.E.2d at 188.
123. Palmyra Assocs., L.L.C. v. Comm’r Highways, 299 Va. 377, 379–80, 851 S.E.2d 743,
744 (2020).
124. See id. at 380–81, 851 S.E.2d at 744–50.
125. Id. at 381, 851 S.E.2d at 745.
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easement (the “take”) but varied significantly on the damage to the
residue.126
VDOT filed post-trial motions seeking to strike the landowner’s
testimony on the damage to the residue.127 The Fluvanna County
Circuit Court agreed that the “testimony should be stricken” and
“stated that it would ‘entertain argument’ by counsel ‘as to whether
the Court should . . . confirm the award of the take only, or grant a
new trial.’”128 Counsel for the landowner stated that it “did not
agree on the court’s ruling striking the testimony, [but] ‘both sides
agree to the first of the 2 options [the court] gave [them].”129 The
landowner appealed and one of its assignments of error was that
“the trial court erred in putting the parties on terms of either the
court confirming the value of the take or ordering a new trial.”130
However, the court noted that the landowner “did not object at
that time that the trial court was ‘putting it on terms,” but rather
“it agreed that the circuit court should confirm the award rather
than grant a new trial.”131 Pursuant to the invited error doctrine,
a litigant cannot approbate and reprobate: “that is ‘invit[ing] error
as the [litigant] . . . did here, and then [attempting to take] advantage of the situation by his own wrong.’”132
Litigation and trials are difficult, stressful, and time-sensitive
endeavors. However, if you disagree with a court’s action (and it is
important enough for a potential appeal), one must disagree or object on the record. Otherwise, either waiver or invited error doctrine will likely apply and bar the appeal.
II. NEW LEGISLATION
The General Assembly has made several seismic changes to the
Virginia court system with an impact on litigation in the commonwealth.

126. Id. at 381, 851 S.E.2d at 745.
127. Id. at 381–82, 851 S.E.2d at 745–46.
128. Id. at 382, 851 S.E.2d at 746.
129. Id. at 382, 851 S.E.2d at 746.
130. Id. at 386, 851 S.E.2d at 748.
131. Id. at 387, 851 S.E.2d at 748.
132. Id. at 387, 851 S.E.2d at 748 (quoting Cohn v. Knowledge Connections, Inc., 266 Va.
362, 367, 585 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2003)).
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A. Expansion of the Court of Appeals
As most know by now, the General Assembly significantly expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of Virginia.133 This
is certainly the largest shakeup of Virginia appellate procedure,
jurisdiction, and the judiciary in decades. However, except for the
size of the court, the effective date of this seismic change was delayed to January 1, 2022.134 Parties in the commonwealth will have
an appeal as a matter of right to the court of appeals in any civil
case.135 There are other significant changes, but because none of
these changes are in effect as of the time of publication, this article
will limit its discussion to this jurisdictional change. Providing an
appeal as a matter of right to every civil case certainly on its face
prolongs the potential timeline or life of a lawsuit, and therefore
the associated fees and costs. No longer is a jury verdict the most
likely final decision. The data from the first couple years following
expansion will be fascinating. Will deep-pocket defendants (or desperate plaintiffs who received nothing) appeal every case with an
evidentiary close call? Will parties be more willing to try cases
knowing that they always have an appeal? One would assume that
parties will test the court of appeals in large volume at first and
only adjust when trends emerge.136 Only one thing is certain: at
some point a lawyer will be thrilled that this new matter-of-right
appeal exists when victory is snatched from the jaws of defeat at
trial and that same lawyer will feel the exact opposite when that
same court takes away a favorable jury verdict.
B. Expansion of Jurisdictional Limits of General District Court
The General Assembly was not done in its changes to the judicial
system. It also increased the jurisdictional limits of the general district courts from $25,000 to $50,000 for personal injury and wrongful death claims.137 This change should significantly increase
133. Act of Mar. 31, 2021, ch. 489, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-626, 15.2-2656, -3221) (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
134. Id. Practitioners may have noticed the ongoing search and applications to fill the
judicial vacancies.
135. § 17.1-405 (Cum Supp. 2021). There are limited exceptions such as actions before
the State Corporation Commission and other corporate administrative issues. § 17.1-406
(Cum. Supp. 2021).
136. It is worthwhile to note that the Court of Appeals can summarily affirm without
oral argument. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:27. (Repl. Vol. 2021).
137. Act of Mar. 18, 2021, ch. 199, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at §§ 8.01195.4, 16.1-77, 16.1-107 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
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caseloads in general district courts for such claims. The speed and
low cost of general district courts certainly should be appealing for
the plaintiffs.
However, it will be interesting to see if the plaintiffs are dissuaded from filing cases with a value between $25,000 and $50,000
because not only will there be an appeal as a matter of right to
circuit court (de novo on appeal) but, as discussed above, there will
be, as of January 1, 2022, an appeal as a matter of right to the court
of appeals should the plaintiff prevail again. The option added a
couple of years ago138 to switch between general district court and
circuit court along with this jurisdictional change certainly increases litigation options and strategies for the plaintiffs.
Hopefully this jurisdictional change works as intended and these
cases are tried and disposed of in general district court, providing
efficiency and finality to parties and decreasing the caseload for
circuit courts.
C. Access to Criminal Files and Incident Information Under the
Virginia Freedom of Information Act
Documents related to a criminal investigation or incident that
are not ongoing are now required to be produced pursuant to the
Virginia Freedom of Information Act.139 The new statute defines
ongoing as “a case in which the prosecution has not been finally
adjudicated, the investigation continues to gather evidence for a
possible future criminal case, and such case would be jeopardized
by the premature release of evidence.”140 The statute defines criminal investigative files as “any documents and information, including complaints, court orders, memoranda, notes, initial incident reports, filings through any incident-based reporting system,
diagrams, maps, photographs, correspondence, reports, witness
statements, or evidence.”141 The statute now specifies the circumstances for exemptions:
1. Would interfere with a particular ongoing criminal investigation or
proceeding in a particularly identifiable manner;

138. Act of Mar. 22, 2019, ch. 787, 2019 Va. Acts 1842, 1843 (codified as amended
at §§ 8.01-195.4, 16.1-77 (Cum. Supp. 2021)).
139. § 2.2-3706.1 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
140. Id. § 2.2-3706.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
141. Id. § 2.2-3706.1(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2021). Before only criminal incident reports, not
the criminal investigative file, were subject to disclosure. Compare id. § 2.2-3706 (Repl. Vol.
2017), with id. § 2.2-3706.1(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
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2. Would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication;
3. Would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
4. Would disclose (i) the identity of a confidential source or (ii) in the
case of a record compiled by a law-enforcement agency in the course
of a criminal investigation, information furnished only by a confidential source;
5. Would disclose law-enforcement investigative techniques and procedures, if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or
6. Would endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.142

These are specific exemptions, but they still leave a fair amount
of discretion, particularly the sixth one. Unless there is a strong
basis for one of these exemptions to apply, criminal incident reports and investigative files must be turned over when requested.
Consequently, third-party subpoenas for such criminal incident reports or investigative files will have to be honored now as well.
D. Limitations on Enforcement of Judgments
The General Assembly lowered the limitations period for the enforcement of a judgement from twenty to ten years.143 The new
statute does still allow extensions. “The limitation [period] . . . may
be extended by the recordation of a certificate . . . in the clerk’s office in which such judgment lien is recorded and executed by either
the judgment lien creditor or by his duly authorized attorney-infact or agent.”144 Of course, the judgment creditor must record the
certificate prior to the expiration of the limitations period.145 The
statute provides a form that the judgment creditor must use for
filing.146 The statute provides that the judgment creditor can record ten year extensions only twice.147 The prior statute had a
twenty-year limitations period which could be extended once for
another twenty-year term.148 Therefore the total amount of time
has decreased from forty years to thirty years. This change lowers
the period for enforcing a judgment and increases the “effort” required from a judgment creditor to enforce its judgment. That is

142. Id. § 2.2-3706.1(C)(1)–(6) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
143. Act of Mar. 31, 2021, ch. 486, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at § 8.01-251 (Cum.
Supp. 2021)).
144. § 8.01-251(B) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
145. Id.
146. Id. § 8.01-251(G) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
147. Id. § 8.01-251(B) (Cum. Supp. 2021).
148. Id. § 8.01-251 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
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consistent with the recent trend of increasing protections for debtors.
E. Res Judicata in Workers’ Compensation
The General Assembly enacted a new statute that preserves all
workers’ compensation claims not “expressly adjudicate[d]” by an
order of the Commission.149 Pursuant to this new statute, res judicata, waiver, abandonment, or dismissal do not apply unless the
order specifically addresses the claim.150 This statute codifies (and
protects) the general approach and understanding by claimant attorneys.
III. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
There have been several changes to the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia over the past year.
A. Electronic Filing in the Supreme Court of Virginia
Technology comes for us all, even the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Electronic filing is now the standard with the Supreme Court of
Virginia.151 Now, with limited exceptions, all documents must be
filed electronically in PDF format.152 In terms of documents, the
appellate record is exempt if it is not available in digital form.153 In
terms of parties, only pro se prisoners and “litigant[s] who ha[ve]
been granted leave by the Court to file documents in paper form”
are exempt from the e-filing requirement.154 When e-filing any
pleading or document, the party must serve via e-mail on the same
date and certify on the pleading the date and e-mail of service.155
Parties exempt from e-filing continue to serve pleadings by mail or
other manners consistent with Rule 1:12.156

149. Act of Mar. 31, 2021, ch. 515, 2021 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at § 65.2-706.2 (Cum.
Supp. 2021)).
150. § 65.2-706.2 (Cum. Supp. 2021).
151. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:1B (Repl. Vol. 2021).
152. R. 5:1B(b) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
153. R. 5:1B(a) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
154. R. 5:1B(b) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
155. R. 5:1B(c) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
156. Id.
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Acknowledging the reality that technical issues arise, the Rules
provide specific guidance when that occurs. If unable to file due to
such a glitch:
[C]ounsel must provide to the clerk of this Court on the next business
day all documentation that exists demonstrating the attempt to electronically file the document in the VACES system, any error message
received in response to the attempt, documentation that the document
was later successfully resubmitted, and a motion requesting that the
Court accept the resubmitted document.157

It is imperative therefore that practitioners document their efforts
and should document what appears on their screen: either via
screenshot or taking a picture of the screen with another device. In
the event the filing system is unavailable in “the last filing hours
of a business day, the office of the clerk of the Court is deemed to
have been closed on that day solely with respect to that attempted
filing and the provisions of Virginia Code [section] 1-210(B) and (C)
apply to that particular attempted filing.”158 E-filed pleadings may
be “digitally signed using the conventional electronic signature
‘s/’,”159 matching the practice in federal court. In a pleasant surprise, if you are filing in paper form, you only need to file the original, copies are no longer required.160
The adoption of e-filing led to changes across a host of Rules for
the sake of consistency. However, those changes generally mirror
the substance discussed above.161 Notably, these e-filing procedures now apply to the (expanding) court of appeals as well.162
B. Petitions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
The Supreme Court of Virginia significantly simplified the rules
regarding petitions for a rehearing and petitioners for a rehearing
en banc for the court of appeals. Now simply “[a]ny party seeking
a rehearing of a decision or order of [a panel of] this Court finally
disposing of a case must, within 14 days following such decision or
order, file a petition for rehearing.”163 The procedure for a

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

R. 5:1B(d) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
Id.
R. 5:1B(f) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
R. 5:1B(e) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
See, e.g., R. 5:5–5:6 (Repl. Vol. 2021).
R. 5A:1 (Repl. Vol. 2021).
R. 5A:33 (Repl. Vol. 2021).
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rehearing en banc is the same.164 Responses to such motions are
still not allowed.165 However, now the court of appeals must rehear
the matter within twenty days of the order granting the rehearing.166
C. Appeal by One Party in Courts Not-of-Record
The Supreme Court of Virginia amended Rule 7B:12 to make it
conform with Virginia Code section 16.1-106(B).167 The new rule
(and the statute) provides that a timely filed notice of appeal “by
one party from a judgment . . . of the general district court is
deemed a timely notice of appeal by any other party.”168 However,
that mutuality only applies to the notice. Each party must still
then perfect its appeal separately.169 This is certainly a welcome
change for practitioners. Prior to this rule (and statutory change),
in any general district court proceeding involving claims by multiple parties, a party risked that the other party would appeal its
claim and leave that as the sole issue in circuit court.170 For example, let’s say a defendant files a counterclaim and the court dismissed both the plaintiff’s original claim and the defendant’s counterclaim. In that scenario, the defendant could note its appeal on
the last day, and if the plaintiff (who was willing to move from litigation) did not appeal, then only the counterclaim survived in circuit court. Under the new rule, parties have an opportunity to preserve all claims to the circuit court.
D. Deposition Transcripts to be Used at Eminent Domain Trial
The Supreme Court of Virginia amended the uniform pretrial
scheduling order for eminent domain proceedings. Specifically, the
order now states that counsel “must confer and attempt to identify
and resolve all issues regarding the use of depositions at trial.”171
Counsel must exchange designations of non-party depositions at
least thirty days before trial.172 The order allows the thirty-day
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

R. 5A:34 (Repl. Vol. 2021).
R. 5A:33–34 (Repl. Vol. 2021).
R. 5A:34 (Repl. Vol. 2021).
R. 7B:12 (Repl. Vol. 2021).
R. 7B:12(A) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
R. 7B:12(B) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
Compare R. 7B:12(A) (Repl. Vol. 2021), with R. 7B:12(A) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
R. 1 app. 3, at XI (Repl. Vol. 2021).
Id.
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deadline to be amended by good cause or agreement of counsel.173
The non-designating party must file its objections or counter-designation within seven days of the designation.174 “Further, it becomes the obligation of the non-designating parties to bring any
objections or other unresolved issues to the court for hearing no
later than 5 days before the day of trial.”175 The rule clarifies expectations and should help streamline issues before trial.

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.

